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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
NO. 98-1920
                    
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
AUDELIZ FONTANEZ,
a/k/a ALEX FONTANEZ,
a/k/a ALEX POLLOCK FONTANEZ
Audeliz Fontanez
Appellant
                    
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 96-cr-00086-1)
District Judge:  Hon. Clarence C. Newcomer
                   
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 11, 2007
BEFORE:  RENDELL and STAPLETON, 
Circuit Judges, and IRENAS, District Judge*
(Opinion Filed:  December 13, 2007)
                    
                                 
*Hon. Joseph E. Irenas, Senior District Judge for the District of New Jersey, sitting by
designation.
2                    
OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
We have before us only No. 98-1920.  On January 30, 2002, we issued a
Certificate of Appealability.  It limited proceedings to the following:
“whether the District Court abused its discretion in failing to allow
Petitioner to amend his 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion.  In addition . . . the
parties should address (a) when, in light of the withdrawal and subsequent
reinstatement of the direct appeal, did Petitioner’s ‘judgment of conviction
become [] final’ for purposes of the statute of limitations; and (b) whether
Petitioner’s motion to amend was timely.” 
 The motion to amend referred to in the Certificate of Appealability is the motion
filed August 27, 1998.  In that motion, Fontanez said only the following with respect to
the issues he sought to place before the Court by amendment:
“There are significant issues that have not been raised by counsel, of record,
in the instant petition which petitioner Fontanez vehemently believes will
conclusively support the ‘ineffective-assistance-of-counsel’ claim and will
further support a vacation of the Judgment of Conviction insofaras (sic) the
verdict was rendered on evidence that was unconstitutionally sound.
***
Petitioner Fontanez’s most significant issue that must be posited before this
Court is ‘actual innocence’ and counsel has failed to raise same, with
support of evidence that has not been presented before to this Court in
previous proceeding(s).”
On October 6, 2004 we denied a motion to expand the Certificate of Appealability
in No. 98-1920.  We ruled at that time that Fontanez’s “new perjury claims [were] beyond 
     1Fontanez’s counsel, in his Anders brief, does not address when petitioner’s judgment
of conviction became final.  Fontanez, in his supplemental brief in response to counsel’s
Anders brief, asserts that his judgment of conviction became final on October 19, 2001,
while the United States asserts that petitioner’s conviction became final on November 29,
2001.  Neither addresses whether the 1998 motion was timely.  We see no value in
pursuing that question further because we find that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying that motion.
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the scope of this appeal” and that these “perjury claims had not been raised in the [District
Court] at the time of the 98-1920 appeal.”  The issue before us thus has nothing to do
with the perjury claims Fontanez currently seeks to pursue.  Rather, the sole issue before
us is whether the District Court abused its discretion in not granting permission to amend
in response to Fontanez’s August 27, 1998 filing.  We hold that it did not.
While Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 provides that leave to amend “shall be freely granted
when justice so requires,” one seeking to amend must provide the Court with sufficient
information to allow it to determine whether justice does so require.  The Court, for
example, must be able to determine such matters as whether the amendment sought would
be futile or unduly prejudicial to the opponent.  When the application to amend provides
only conclusory statements like the “evidence . . . was unconstitutionally sound” and
“actual innocence,” the Court is not able to fulfill its responsibilities under Fed. R. Civ. P.
15, and it does not abuse its discretion if it denies the application.1
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
